



Dallas Police Department Preliminary After Action Report

Date of Review 6/12/20

EVENT/INCIDENT INFORMATION

Event Name Protest for Equality
CAD Incident # _____

Event Start Date	<u>5/29/20</u>	Event End Date	<u>6/1/20</u>
Roll Call Time	<u>N/A</u>		
Event Start Time	<u>3:00PM</u>		
Event End Time	<u>Varies</u>		
Demobilization Time	_____		

Reviewer(s):

Name	Title	Role in Event

STAFFING DETAILS

Note that all fields are mandatory. If a resource was not used, please enter zero.

	Final Staffing Number	Regular Time Hours*	Overtime Hours*	TOTAL
Assistant Chiefs	1	80.00	118.00	198.00
Deputy Chiefs	3	240.00	224.00	464.00
Majors	11	880.00	660.00	1,540.00
Lieutenants	11	880.00	660.00	1,540.00
Sergeants	55	440.00	220.00	660.00
Officers		634.75	634.00	1,268.75
Other				0.00
TOTAL HOURS WORKED				5,670.75

*Number of hours, cumulative total

DEBRIEF

1. Event Summary

What was expected to happen? What actually occurred? What was our response? Describe any applications of force.

Overview:

DPD procedures have consistently supported free speech and the safety of all persons, including protesters, counter-protesters, and uninvolved residents. This support involves attempting to obtain march routes to reduce the potential for accidents or other incidents when protesters march on active roadways. The primary restrictions and guidelines provided to protest groups have mandated those groups would not be allowed to march on highways and freeways, as these pose extreme safety concerns for demonstrators and officers involved. All groups receive instruction to use the sidewalks and not block intersections or streets when necessary through our Intelligence Team.

The Dallas Police Patrol Divisions used response teams to ensure safety for those exercising their first amendment rights, for other persons in the area, and to prevent property destruction. The overall concept of the operation was for officers to be highly visible, control crowds when warranted, provide safety for the participants/spectators/residents, and reduce the number of incidents that could require a police response.

The Dallas Police Department's (DPD) Special Weapons and Tactics Unit (SWAT) was assigned to provide departmental support for the protest march scheduled to begin at Dallas Police Headquarters and end at the Dallas Police Association (DPA) offices and then return. The SWAT Unit role at these protests are typically to provide for observation through the use of Counter Sniper (CS) positions. On July 7, 2017, a lone individual began firing a weapon at protesters and officers without provocation. The (CS) positions provide an immediate response capability through the use of Quick Reaction Teams (QRTs), and are able to mitigate high threat situations such as an active shooter or someone targeting the protesters or officers. SWAT Unit Personnel in these roles wear their typical SWAT operational uniform, including a heavy vest, helmet, rifle, and other specific equipment. It should be noted that SWAT is not visible to protesters until tactical response is needed. SWAT's role for this protest was consistent with the deployment method utilized by DPD regularly.

DEBRIEF CONTINUED

Friday, May 29, 2020:

Operational Planning:

The Next Generation Action Network (NGAN) hosted a Solidarity Rally/March for George Floyd. The event was scheduled to begin at 6:30 p.m., at Jack Evans Headquarters. A march was scheduled to begin at 7:45 p.m. and proceed to the Dallas Police Association located at 1412 Griffin Street.

An operation plan was prepared for this event with the mission of the Dallas Police Department to provide a safe environment for all including spectators, employees, participants, and officers. Several departmental resources were used for this event including Patrol Response Teams from Central/CBD, Northeast, Southwest, and North Central Patrol Divisions. A Response Team is comprised of a sergeant and five to seven officers. Their primary duties on this team would have been to respond quickly to identified locations and provide support to the protesters in the form of traffic control and, if necessary, prevent assaults against persons, prevent looting, and destruction of private/public property.

DPD Response:

Once the protests left the DPA building, some protesters began to venture into smaller groups. A very large group of protesters encountered officers at the Griffin/Young intersection and began to surround the officers. Officers attempted to peacefully disperse the crowd by giving verbal commands on the PA system. The large group then began to throw bricks, rocks, frozen water battles, and other items at officers and police vehicles. Due to the aggression of the crowd and fearing for the safety of the officers, SWAT was called in to assist with the large crowd. Patrol Officers were outnumbered and attempted to disperse the crowd with less than lethal equipment, (40mm and pepper ball launchers). Once SWAT arrived, gas was deployed and the crowd started to disperse. Large groups continued to gather and as Patrol Officers encountered these groups, the groups became aggressive by throwing items in an attempt to injure officers. The large groups that had splintered off began damaging businesses and squad cars, setting squad cars on fire, and burglarizing businesses. Patrol Officers then began responding to 911 calls regarding these types of incidents. Several shots fired calls were received as the aggressive protesters were burglarizing and damaging businesses. This continued to the early hours Saturday morning. One female officer was struck in the head and was transported from the location.

The SWAT Unit maintained a hidden position with the ability to respond but did not become involved in the protest march. The protest group had been peaceful, but was verbally aggressive towards officers, by yelling profanities and using profane hand gestures toward officers. The crowd surrounded squad cars causing damage by beating on the vehicles and throwing objects such as bricks and frozen water bottles. . A unidentified officer called for assistance over the police radio due to the aggressive, violent crowd throwing bricks into windshields with officers trapped inside the vehicles. The SWAT Unit responded to support the officers needing assistance and attempted to regain order. The SWAT Commander responded with one of the SWAT squads (7-10 swat members) that ended up at the intersection of Griffin and Young streets. The SWAT Commander gave several verbal commands over the Public Address System (PA) for the crowd to disperse.

The use of the PA only seemed to infuriate the crowd, with some individuals continuing to throw bricks, frozen water bottles and jumping onto vehicles. The only available tactic to regain order and disperse the crowd was the deployment of CS gas. The Swat Commander's responsibility is to protect residents, as well as officers. Therefore, based on their training and experience, Lieutenant Mark Vernon, Swat commander gave the command to deploy gas. The purpose of CS gas is designed to disperse crowds, forcing the crowd to leave an area by causing temporary discomfort. As the CS gas deployment began, the crowd continued to hurl various objects bricks, rocks and frozen water bottles at officers. Eleven swat officers and two patrol officers were injured(scrapes, bruises).as a result of the objects striking them . A female officer was struck in the face and required stitches. Multiple SWAT vehicles had their windows broken and tires slashed, while other vehicles were spray-painted with profanities.

The CS gas deployment initiated the spread of the crowd, and officers began to regain order by forming a line, gaining control of that area. Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs) that were in standby locations responded at this time. The APCs provided coverage during the use of public address loudspeakers and officer presence. Individuals continued aggressively throwing bricks, rocks, and frozen water bottles. Those items struck many officers. SWAT Officers used a variety of less-lethal crowd control devices such as: pepper-ball mace, 44mm rounds, and hand deployed CS gas, designed to disperse aggressive crowds or take individuals into custody. Officers were not able to identify individuals to make a custodial arrest. SWAT Unit personnel are specially trained and equipped to deploy these items for dispersing crowds in situations of civil disorder.

DEBRIEF CONTINUED

After aggressive displays of violence/force against officers at the Griffin/Young intersections, SWAT/Patrol received multiple calls to disperse the large groups of protesters that began roving throughout the downtown area attacking officers, damaging property, and starting fires (and posing significant danger to any peaceful protesters, innocent residents and anyone else caught in the vicinity of these groups). These aggressive crowds were very mobile and moved around throughout downtown taking over locations. Response team officers encountering them were almost always significantly outnumbered and were unable to contain, control, move, or disperse these crowds. There were numerous calls for assistance received throughout the night, including incidents of shots fired downtown around officers, but even when significant numbers of response teams were present, at these calls officers were unable to control or disperse the crowds. The officers deployed multiple rounds of pepper-ball mace into the ground in an attempt to push the crowd back and cause them to disperse which proved to be ineffective.

Throughout the night and into the early morning hours of Saturday, SWAT was responding to assistance calls from various groups of officers. When the SWAT Unit would arrive with the APCs and deploy the crowd control devices (smoke, gas, 40mm launched flash bangs, or direct impact marking and foam rounds), the groups would move or splinter into other groups and depart from the immediate area. The APCs provided an immediate visible officer presence for the crowds to see and also allowed the SWAT Unit to move in a protected vehicle capable of withstanding bricks, metal objects, and weapon engagement from rifle and pistol attacks. The APCs allow officers to carry replenishment items such as gas or other less-lethal equipment due to the significant amount of crowd control items utilized to disperse these crowds. Throughout the night, SWAT personnel in small groups supported by APCs provided support for patrol officers and response teams as DPD worked to regain control of the downtown area. When individuals were allowed to gather up together into larger groups, they became increasingly aggressive and began damaging property, looting, or setting fires. Outnumbered DPD officers could not physically control or contain these groups. The most effective tactic at the time was to disperse these groups and prevent those groups from gathering together continually. During the night, a large aggressive crowd of what looked to be several hundred took over Commerce Street and moved physical construction barriers setting up a wall between themselves and officers. These crowds injured officers, damaged property, burglarized businesses, and committed thefts in the downtown area. Businesses that were impacted include multiple 7/11's, Neiman Marcus, and other downtown business locations in Deep Ellum.

DEBRIEF CONTINUED

SWAT Unit Personnel utilizing the crowd control devices such as CS gas, pepper-ball mace, and 40mm stingers proved to be the most effective method of dispersing the crowds and preventing the looting and other violent criminal activities. These officers tactically responded to calls for rapid support. When officers encountered individuals who were aggressively throwing objects, bricks frozen water bottles officers used 40mm less lethal equipment to prevent themselves from receiving more injuries. At the scene, they quickly developed the best tactical plan for the downtown area. SWAT Unit officers are trained and equipped to safely and effectively deploy a variety of less-lethal and crowd control devices and did so prudently and effectively throughout the night.

The SWAT Unit deployed a variety of crowd control dispersal devices throughout this evening (see attached list). These devices, both handheld and 40mm launched, are specially designed to be less lethal and allow officers to as safely as possible disperse uncooperative aggressive, violent crowds.

Throughout Friday night, eleven DPD SWAT Personnel were struck and injured with various items such as bricks, rocks, fireworks, and frozen water bottles. Two patrol officers were also injured. One female officer required stitches. Almost all SWAT and Non-SWAT Personnel were targeted by individuals actively throwing these items at officers as they attempted to restore order.

DEBRIEF CONTINUED

Saturday, May 30, 2020:

Operational Planning:

The Dallas Alliance Against Racist and Political Repression, National Alliance Against Racist and Political Repression, and the UTA Progressive Student Union hosted a Justice for George Floyd and Atatiana Jefferson Car Rally. This event started at 1:30 p.m. at City Hall and proceeded to the Frank Crowley Court House located at 111 Commerce Street.

An operation plan was prepared for this event with the mission of the Dallas Police Department to provide a safe environment for all including spectators, employees, participants, and officers. Several Departmental resources were used for this event including eight Response Teams from: Central/CBD, Northeast, Southeast, Southwest, Northwest, North Central, and South-Central Patrol Divisions.

DPD Response:

Due to the protests which quickly turned into aggressive crowds on Friday night throughout the downtown area, additional Tactical/Special Response Team (SRT) Units from the Department of Public Safety (DPS) and Irving Police Department SWAT supported DPD throughout the day on Saturday. As the situation escalated later in the evening on Saturday, this along with a shortage of less-lethal supplies (as described above) and the very mobile smaller groups that were moving throughout the downtown area, the Garland Police Department SWAT Unit responded to provide additional support. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) local SWAT Team moved to a staging area close to downtown on standby to support Dallas Police Department in the event the situation further escalated out of control or fell into the jurisdiction of Federal Law Enforcement Officers.

DPD SWAT, DPS SRT, and Irving SWAT were initially in a supportive role for the various response teams tasked with dealing with any protests on Saturday. SWAT personnel were staged at the station and were only working in a few small pairs of officers attempting to provide Counter Sniper (CS) teams for practical locations. APCs and QRTs staged at the station where they were needed to respond and support the assigned response teams. The protest at City Hall began peacefully, with the protesters marching several times throughout the downtown area. Upon the crowd's return to City Hall, they reinvigorated themselves by drinking water and sitting in the shade and then they continued protesting. Once again, this crowd left City Hall to march through downtown, however, when the crowd returned for a third time, the crowd had grown exponentially.

The group arrived at City Hall, things began to get out of control, Two Patrol Response Teams, led by Lieutenant David Conley, were stationed behind City Hall. Major Shead, who was in the Command Post (CP) within City Hall on the second floor, requested a response team to report to City Hall Plaza because a white male was outfitted with a gas mask and long gun. At that time, Major Shead feared for the man's safety because the crowd had surrounded him. The crowd did not harm the protester and he freely left the location. Lt. Conley and his response team responded to assist the man. As the crowd amassed, Lt. Conley's squad car was surrounded by an angry contingent of protesters, resulting in Lt. Conley sustaining injuries and calling for SWAT's assistance.

DPD SWAT with DPS SRT and Irving SWAT responded to the aggressive situation where the response teams were attempting to disperse the crowd with no effect. Upon arrival, the SWAT Unit began deploying gas into the non-compliant crowd that was refusing to disperse at City Hall. These groups did not disperse until SWAT Officers began moving towards them using APCs and a variety of crowd control devices. The situation again had descended into (disorderly and uncontrollable behavior by various individuals within the crowd. Multiple suspects in the crowd were wearing protective equipment and were throwing the gas canisters back at officers.

DEBRIEF CONTINUED

SWAT Personnel supported the response teams and were able to clear City Hall Plaza and began pushing the groups back off of City Hall property. Large groups were still in the parking areas and on the streets south of City Hall when SWAT and the response teams were consolidating to ensure they did not return to the property. Multiple officers continually told the groups to disperse, but most refused and again began agitating the crowd to confront officers. Once more officers were present, SWAT attempted to disperse the crowd again by moving towards them and deploying crowd control devices (CS gas, PepperBall, and 40mm launched rounds). Officers made multiple arrests while following several different groups, several streets over to get dispersed. The area around City Hall was under control with no significant issues after holding this area for a significant amount of time.

As the afternoon and evening continued, multiple groups of individuals began gathering throughout the downtown area and Victory Plaza area and even moved up along McKinney Avenue. These groups were committing offenses, damaging property, setting fires, throwing objects, and committing other violent offenses. The SWAT Unit, along with the other tactical units, moved from location to location, attempting to assist the outnumbered response team officers. DPD SWAT employed similar tactics that had proven effective on Friday night, by utilizing the APCs and crowd control items to disperse the groups; however, the groups utilized similar tactics as well by running away from officers and then regrouping to engage in violent activities in another area. Again, on Saturday night, there were shots fired incidents and widespread violent actions by these crowds. This behavior continued throughout the night with SWAT supporting officers, dispersing the crowds, and response team officers attempting to hold the areas to prevent the groups from reengaging. Officers had to use less than lethal equipment and the assistance of SWAT units to combat the large crowds and effect some arrests. The large crowd continued to destroy property and commit criminal property crimes. The crowd continued to assault officers by throwing various items.

Once certain areas/ intersections were cleared, response team officers were stationed at these intersections to maintain control. This behavior continued throughout the night into Sunday morning when order was finally restored.

Sunday, May 31, 2020

Operational Planning:

There were three separate scheduled protest events for this date. The locations of these events were at the Omni Hotel, Klyde Warren Park, and the Frank Crowley Courts building. The estimated crowd size for these events was between 1000-1500 people. An operation plan was prepared for this event with the mission of the Dallas Police Department to provide a safe environment for all including spectators, employees, participants, and officers. Several Departmental resources were used on this date to include Response Teams from the seven patrol divisions. Additionally, based on the location of these protests, the operational plan was changed to include four geographical zones in the downtown corridor to provide better command and control to commanders monitoring these events.

DPD Response:

With the downtown Dallas curfew scheduled to go into effect at 7pm, Response Teams were strategically placed in certain areas of the city to maintain order and lawfully address any incidents that may arise. Sunday was pretty uneventful and Response Teams were left to patrol the downtown, uptown, and Deep Ellum areas because those specific areas were the targeted areas that the violence and destruction had taken place the two days prior. At 7pm, within the curfew zone areas, several announcements were made over PAs that the curfew was in effect. Individuals in the curfew zone were given forty minutes for gainful compliance. Later in the night, Response Team officers made two curfew violation arrests outside of the Jack Evans Headquarters building and another 135 curfew zone violations.

SWAT remained in traditional tactical response mode, providing over-watch observation positions and Quick Reaction Teams (QRTs) remained ready at the station throughout the day and evening hours. Shortly after the curfew went into effect, the response teams had problems with some specific groups. SWAT was requested to respond and assist with dispersing the crowds. DPD SWAT, along with DPS SRT, responded and supported the dispersing of the crowds through the combined use of highly visible officer presence in APCs and various crowd dispersal devices – pepperball mace and flash bangs. This response was approximately one hour on Sunday evening. Afterwards, DPD SWAT and DPS SRT returned to the station in a standby mode. DPD SWAT and DPS SRT did not respond to any other incident for the remainder of the night.

DEBRIEF CONTINUED

Monday, June 1, 2020

Operational Planning:

There were two events planned for this date: The NGAN hosting a Solidarity Rally/March for George Floyd Part 2 and March for Justice. An operation plan was prepared for this event with the mission of the Dallas Police Department to provide a safe environment for all including spectators, employees, participants, and officers. Several Departmental resources were used on this date to include Response Teams from the seven patrol divisions. Additionally, based on the location of these protests, the operation plan was changed to include four geographical zones in the downtown corridor to provide better command and control to commanders monitoring these events.

DPD Response:

Response teams were strategically deployed to provide safety for the protesters and to bring to order any criminal violations of the law. A large group of protesters congregated at the Frank Crowley Courthouse. Sergeant Jeff Hall attempted to contact NGAN organizer, Dominique Alexander, throughout the day. Sgt. Hall made several attempts, via phone and text, but was unsuccessful. At the courthouse, Sgt. Hall was able to speak (via text) with Mr. Alexander, who stated that the group would only be marching in a circle. Using this information on the route, Dallas Police cleared the Eastbound lanes on Riverfront Blvd. for those participating in the march. After a few hours at the courthouse, the large group of protesters starting marching toward Riverfront Blvd. and then made a u-turn on to Trinity Groves. They marched North on Trinity Groves and neared the Margret Hunt Hill Bridge. There were Dallas County Sheriffs Officers staged at the base of the bridge with their lights on. The crowd disobeyed the officers and began marching on the bridge. Commanders gave direction to the response teams over the police radio to get in front of the crowd on the other side of the bridge for safety reasons - Speed on the bridge, hours of darkness, etc. As officers made it to the other side of the bridge and started walking towards the crowd, some individuals from the group started jumping to the other side of the bridge. Officers were directed to shut down both directions of the bridge for safety reasons. There was a large crowd on the bridge that had already ignored officers commands (to leave the bridge) and then some in the crowd began to throw water bottles filled with baking soda in front of officers lined in formation. Patrol Officers used pepper ball launchers on the ground to stop the crowd from moving forward and for officer's safety as some in the crowd were throwing objects at officers. SWAT was requested to the bridge and assisted patrol with giving directions to the crowd. A SWAT QRT immediately responded to support the response teams on the West side of the bridge as the large group of protesters attempted to go into West Dallas. SWAT Personnel immediately deployed two CS canisters onto the Westbound lanes between the line of protesters and officers in an attempt to create a barrier for the safety of the response team officers. These two canisters were ineffective as they rolled to the northern edge of the bridge and the wind carried the cloud off the bridge.

Due to the wind and not obtaining the desired effect of creating a wall of gas from the first two canisters, a smoke canister and then two additional gas canisters were deployed on the Eastbound lanes of the bridge. This was again a tactical attempt to generate a smoke/CS barrier between the huge group of protesters and the small outnumbered line of officers and to prevent them from getting onto the Eastbound lanes and surrounding officers positioned to stop the Westbound movement on the bridge. This CS deployment was not directed into the crowd and was not an attempt to disperse the crowd, only stop their movement and aggression towards the officers in front of them. Once the crowd began to comply with officer's direction, no launchers were used and the crowd was taken into custody. Commanders on the bridge immediately called for DFR to come to the bridge. There were over 600 persons taken into custody, with only a couple reported injuries. There were several hundred protesters filming the incident and this included media on the bridge, as well. Air One had an aerial view. There was one council-member on the bridge that thanked the officers for a job well done. Lieutenant Brian Payne was assigned to coordinate the arrests of the protesters and this required him to walk the bridge several times and he observed the following: Several rocks/ small pieces of bricks, two handguns, one small hammer, one can of propane, one bottle of lighter fluid, numerous cans of spray paint, and multiple bags of baking soda which can be added to water bottles to make them explode. All of the aforementioned contraband was not placed in the property room as it was not related to the offense of pedestrian in the roadway. Due several hundred protesters on the bridge we were unable to determine what contraband belonged to what protesters.

Please see the e-mail attached to the description of SWAT actions on Monday evening during the bridge incident.

Also, please see the attached list of estimated Crowd Control and Less Lethal expenditures predominantly utilized on Friday and Saturday nights.

2. Successes

What went well and why? What were the successful steps towards achieving the objectives?

Successes	How to ensure success in the future
<p>Identified the need to separate the downtown corridor into zones to provide greater command and control for commanders monitoring events in these areas.</p>	

3. Improvements

What can be improved and how? What can we do differently in similar situations in the future? Compare the plan with reality.

What didn't work? What is your advice to future event commanders?

Areas for Improvement	Recommendations
<p>Identify Incident Commanders Processing center established for mass arrest Provisions for officers Communication with law enforcement</p>	<p>Create a fluid commanders list Have identified team for large protest Food service team Designated channel for communications</p>

Vernon, Mark

From: Vernon, Mark
Sent: Sunday, June 7, 2020, 4:59 PM
To: Moore, Avery
Cc: Igo, Michael Bridge
Subject:

Chief,

When the SWAT QRT arrived to support patrol officers as the crowd was still moving towards the officer line, they deployed (onto the Westbound lanes), two CS canisters to generate space between the crowd and officers. At this time, the patrol officers were utilizing PepperBall area saturation and 40mm Stinger rounds to keep the crowds from their police line. These two CS canisters rolled to the edge of the bridge and were completely ineffective due to the wind direction.

Due to the wind and not obtaining the desired effect of creating a wall to prevent the crowd from advancing, a consultation with Major Junger about the plan resulted in a smoke canister followed by the deployment of two CS canisters on the Eastbound lanes of the bridge. This deployment of smoke, followed by CS gas, was a tactical attempt to generate a smoke/CS barrier between the huge protest group and the small outnumbered line of officers positioned to keep the crowd from traveling into West Dallas. The CS deployed was not intended to disperse the crowd, only prevent forward movement towards the officers and to prevent individuals from climbing over into the Eastbound lanes and getting behind the line of officers stopping their Westbound movement.

Please advise if any additional information is required.

R/S

Estimated - SWAT Unit Crowd Control and Less Lethal Expenditures (Almost all utilized on Friday/Saturday nights)

Hand Deployed Items.

<u>Item Description:</u>	<u>Estimated Quantity Utilized:</u>
Tripler Phaser Canister Gas	36
CS Riot Smoke	106
Outdoor/Max Smoke	23
CS Flameless Tri-Chamber	31
CN Flameless Tri-Chamber	23
CS or QC or OC/CS Indoor Vapor (Gas)	30
CS Tear Ball	36
Non-irritant Sting Ball	32
Estimated Total Hand Deployed Utilized by SWAT:	317

Hand deployed less-lethal items are primarily gas canisters. CS gas' function is to cause temporary discomfort and make it difficult for suspects to remain in an area, disperse crowds, create a smoke/vapor barrier to prevent movement, and make it challenging to continue aggressive actions.

40 MM Launcher Deployed Items.

<u>Item Description:</u>	<u>Estimated Quantity Utilized:</u>
Exact Impact Foam Baton	84
Exact Impact Foam Baton (Extended Range)	76
Direct Impact OC	32
Multi 3-Foam Baton	54
.60 Cal Sting Ball	40
Ariel Flash Bangs (Various Range Styles)	47
Skat Shell CS	2
Estimated 40mm Launcher Deployed Utilized by SWAT:	335

The utilization of 40mm launchable items allows officers to maintain distance while dispersing aggressive crowds. These items help to keep officers safe by keeping them out of the range of bricks, rocks, or other hand-thrown items. These items also contain a variety of gas and rubber projectiles, depending on the specific item. There are other launchable items designed for taking suspects into custody or keeping them away from officers.

Note:

These are the estimated numbers. Issuance of Less Lethal and Riot Control items is logged and tracked when issued under normal circumstances. Due to the urgency of maintaining order during the riots and increasing threats of violence, arson, and other property damage that erupted on Friday and Saturday nights, any items available in storage were immediately distributed to SWAT Personnel or loaded on APCs for immediate response. Therefore, exact numbers were not tracked and logged as in the normal issuance process.